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Introduction
Hong Kong's first anti-discrimination laws, the Sex Discrimination Ordinance
(the 'SDO') and the Disability Discrimination Ordinance (the 'DDO'), went
into force in late 1996. Since that time, the Equal Opportunities Commission
(the 'EOC') has received a substantial number of complaints of unlawful
discrimination and harassment. While many complaints have been successfully
conciliated by the EOC, others have been slowly working their way to court.
In March 1999 the District Court gave judgement in the first two cases to be
tried as a result of individual complaints.1
Part I of this article analyses the liability issues in the case of Yuen Sha Sha
v Tse Chi Pan,2 in which the court held that secret video-taping of a university
student (while she was undressing in her room) constituted unlawful sexual
harassment under the SDO. This is one of the few reported cases (from any
jurisdiction) in which liability for sexual harassment has been based entirely
upon acts that violated a woman's privacy. It is therefore an important
precedent and likely to be relied upon by other women in Hong Kong.
Part 1I of the article considers the remedies in Yuen Sha Sha. The court
awarded a total of $80,000 in damages, (including $30,000 in aggravated and
exemplary damages). This is arguably a reasonable award, given that the
plaintiff did not claim any economic loss. However, in my view the award for
injury to feelings should have been larger. The court's analysis of damages
missed the crux of her claim and focussed too heavily on the issue of damage to
her reputation.
Part III of the article discusses the case of Ma Bik Yung v Ko Chuen,3 in which
a taxi driver was found to have committed disability discrimination and
harassment against his passenger. This case offers a dramatic illustration of the
open hostility that disabled people often face in our community. It also
demonstrates the limitations of the 'unjustifiable hardship' defence, which the
defendant (who also suffered from a disability) unsuccessfully argued. The court
1 The only cases decided before these two (relating to discriminatory advertisements) were initiated
by the EOC. See, for example, Equal Opportunities Commission vApple Daily Ltd [1999] 1 HKC 202,
in which the EOC successfully appealed a decision of the District Court (on the question of whether
an advertisement violated s 43 of the SDO).
2 Yuen Sha Sha v Tse Chi Pan [199911 HKC 731 (hereinafter referred to as'Yuen SM Sha').
3 Ma Bik Yungv Ko Chuen [199911 HKC 714 (hereinafter referred to as'Ma Bik Yung). InJuly 1999,
1 udge Wong refused the defendant's request for leave to appeal. However the Court of Appeal
subsequently granted leave and the appeal will likely be heard in early 2000.
awarded a total of $20,000 in damages, including exemplary damages for the
particularly oppressive behaviour of the defendant. The decision represents an
important affirmation of the rights of the disabled under the new legislation.
However, the damages award was quite small and may discourage other victims
(particularly those who have not suffered any tangible economic loss) from
litigating their claims.
Part IV concludes by briefly commenting upon the court's approach to the
issue of legal costs. The anti-discrimination legislation departs from the general
rule in Hong Kong by providing that the parties will normally bear their own
respective legal costs. (As I will argue below, this makes it especially important
that successful plaintiffs receive reasonable damage awards.) However, costs
may be awarded if special circumstances warrant it.4 In the two cases discussed
here, the court did find special circumstances and awarded costs to the
plaintiffs. As discussed below, the awards of costs could not be enforced in these
two cases, as both defendants received legal aid. However, the court's reasoning
may encourage parties in future cases to act reasonably and to take better
advantage of the conciliation services offered by the EOC.
I. Videotaping as a form of sexual harassment: the liability issues in
Yuen Sha Sha
The law of sexual harassment was initially developed through judicial
interpretation of statutes that prohibited sex discrimination.' However many
jurisdictions have recently taken the concept a step further and enacted
statutes that expressly define and prohibit sexual harassment.6 This approach
eliminates the need for the plaintiff to show that the harassment constituted
unfavourable treatment on the ground of her sex, which can be problematic in
some cases. For example, a defendant might claim that both male and female
employees were equally offended by pornographic posters and lewd jokes at the
workplace, arguably defeating the claim that they constituted unfavourable
treatment on the ground of sex.7 However, in the statutory model, this would
District Court Ordinance, ss 73(B)(3), 73(C)(3), and 73(D)(3).
See, for example, Strathclyde Regional Council v Porcelli [1986] IRLR 134 CS (sexual harassment can
constitute discrimination within the meaning of the UK Sex Discrimination Act 1975); and Meritor
Savings Bank, FSB v Vinson, 477 US 57 (1990) (in which the United States Supreme Court endorsed
guidelines of the Equal Employment Opportunities Commission that characterised sexual harassment
as a form of unlawful sex discrimination).
In 1993, the Canadian Human Rights Act was amended so as to expressly prohibit sexual harassment.
See Canadian Human Rights Act, s 14. In Australia, the Federal, Victorian, New South Wales, South
Australian, Western Australian, Australian Capital Territory and Northern Territory legislation all
contain specific provisions prohibiting sexual harassment. See Australian and New Zealand Equal
Opportunities Law and Practice (CCH Australia Limited), at 59-500.
See, for example, Stewart v Cleveland Guest (Engineering) Ltd [1994] IRLR 440, in which the
"Employment Appeal Tribunal upheld a decision that pictures of nude women did not constitute sex
discrimination under the UK Sex Discrimination Act because a man might have found the pictures
equally offensive.
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not be a defence, as the conduct would still meet the definition of prohibited
sexual harassment.
As a relative newcomer to the field of anti-discrimination law, Hong Kong
was in a position to learn from the experience of other jurisdictions and adopt
a progressive model. Unfortunately, with respect to most of the provisions of
the SDO, the Government did not take that opportunity and instead slavishly
copied the UK Sex Discrimination Act 1975. However, the UK Act did not
include provisions that expressly prohibited sexual harassment and the Hong
Kong Government had promised women's organisations that the SDO would
do so. Thus the Government decided to use Australian federal legislation as its
model (with some additional language provided from Anna Wu's Equal
Opportunities Bill, which was based upon Western Australian law).
As a result, the SDO expressly defines sexual harassment and prohibits it in
a wide range of activities, including employment, the provision of goods,
facilities and services, and education. In the field of education, the classic case
of sexual harassment is that of a teacher harassing a student (for example by
making good marks conditional upon sexual relations). In such cases, the
educational institution (as the employer of the teacher) also would normally be
held liable for the unlawful harassment.8
However, the SDO also prohibits student to student sexual harassment (at
s 39(3)). This form of harassment is most common at universities (where
students live together in close quarters) and it has recently generated considerable
public attention in Hong Kong.9 The SDO does not normally make a
university liable for an unlawful act committed by a student.'0 Nonetheless,
educational institutions have an obligation to address sexual harassment by
students. It is most often directed at female students and can significantly
interfere with their right to an equal and respectful learning environment.
8 SDO s 46 makes the employer liable for the unlawful acts of its employees, regardless of whether the
acts were done with the employer's knowledge or consent. However, it is a defence for the employer
to show that it took'such steps as are reasonably practicable' to prevent the unlawful behaviour. For
a discussion of the steps that an employer should take to prevent unlawful discrimination and
harassment, see Carole J. Petersen, 'Hong Kong's First Anti-Discrimination Laws and their Potential
Impact on the Employment Market' 27 HKLJ 324 (1997).
9 See, for example, Shirley Kwok, 'Medical student banned over dormitory assault', South China
Morning Post, 3 February 1999, p 3 (reporting on a university student who pleaded guilty to assault
causing actual bodily harm after he attacked a woman in her dormitory). Another student admitted
sending pornographic and threatening emails (including a death threat) to a student feminist group.
He was convicted of criminal intimidation (see Angela Lau, 'Email offender spared jail', South China
Morning Post, 15 July 1999, p 7), and expelled from the University of Hong Kong. The primary victim
also filed a complaint for sexual harassment with the EOC, which was successfully conciliated (the
settlement terms are confidential). It has also been alleged that one or more students have taken peep-
shot photographs of female students in dormitory rooms and bathrooms, which have then been posted
on the internet. See 'Nude "students" on Net', South China Morning Post, 13 April 1999, p 6.
10 Of course, if the alleged harasser was an employee as well as a student (for example, a graduate student
who was also appointed as a tutor), then the normal rule of employer's liability (stated in s 46 of the
SDO) would apply.
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The facts of Yuen Sha Sha demonstrate just how serious the problem can be.
In March 1997, the plaintiff, a female student at the Chinese University of
Hong Kong, accidentally discovered a camcorder hidden inside a paper box on
top of her roommate's wardrobe. The camcorder contained a working videotape
and was pointed toward the plaintiffs bed and wardrobe, where she normally
changed clothes. The plaintiff also found some books beneath the camcorder,
one of which bore the name of the defendant, the boyfriend of the plaintiffs
roommate. The plaintiff confronted the defendant and he admitted that he
had been filming her over a period of several months." According to an agreed
statement of scenes, the videotape showed the plaintiff in various states of
undress. One scene also showed the defendant adjusting the angle of the
camcorder in front of the plaintiffs wardrobe and pointing at the lens,
indicating that he had deliberately targeted her dressing area. He also
admitted showing at least one videotape of the plaintiff to a male friend who
knew her.'2
The Chinese University of Hong Kong expelled the defendant (as a result
of a complaint filed under its own sexual harassment procedures). However, the
plaintiff herself could not receive compensation under those procedures and
therefore exercised her right to file a complaint under the SDO. Although
there was very little dispute over the facts, the defendant refused to settle the
matter or even to give a genuine apology for his actions."
At the trial (held almost two years after the plaintiff discovered the camera),
the defendant did not give evidence or call any witnesses, and on the second
day of the hearing his counsel indicated that he admitted liability. 4 As a result,
the judge apparently decided that it was not necessary to give a detailed analysis
of liability in her decision. This is unfortunate, not only because the case was
the first complaint of sexual harassment to be tried in the District Court but also
because there are very few reported decisions on this type of sexual harassment.
The vast majority of sexual harassment complaints arise in the context of
employment and can be classified into one of two general categories: (i) quid
pro quo harassment, which occurs when a person in power makes an unwelcome
sexual advance in return for a benefit or under threat of a detriment; or
(ii) hostile environment harassment, which occurs when the defendant uses
sexual conduct (such as lewd jokes, photographs or gestures) to overtly
embarrass and intimidate the plaintiff. Yuen Sha Sha is one of the few reported
cases of sexual harassment arising from secret videotaping and it could be
applied to a number of similar activities. For example, it could be applied to the
alleged peep-shot photographs of students15 or to a case in which a woman
't Note 2 above, p 736.
' Ibid, p 735-737.
13 Ibid, p 744-46.
14 Ibid, p 735.
15 See note 9 above.
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catches a man hiding in a bathroom and spying on her (which has occurred
recently at a university in Hong Kong). Thus it is appropriate to consider
precisely how the defendant's actions satisfied the statutory definition of
unlawful harassment.
Section 2(5 )(a) of the SDO provides the definition of sexual harassment
that applies to the field of education:
... a person (howsoever described) sexually harasses a woman if-
(a) the person-
(i) makes an unwelcome sexual advance, or an unwelcome request for
sexual favours, to her;
or
(ii) engages in other unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature in relation
to her,
in circumstances in which a reasonable person, having regard to all the
circumstances, would have anticipated that she would be offended, humiliated
or intimidated ....
As the defendant did not make sexual advances to the plaintiff, s 2(5)(a)(ii)
is obviously the relevant definition. It can be divided into four elements:
(1) unwelcome conduct; (2) of a sexual nature; (3) in relation to the plaintiff;
and (4) which is such that a reasonable person would anticipate that the
plaintiff would be offended, humiliated or intimidated. The court did not
expressly consider these elements in any detail. However, given the importance
of the case, it would have been useful to do so and I would suggest the following
analysis:
(1) unwelcome conduct
In many cases of quid pro quo sexual harassment, this is the most contentious
issue. The defendant will often testify that the plaintiffs behaviour at the
relevant time made him believe that she welcomed his advances. However, in
Yuen Sha Sha the defendant filmed the plaintiff without her knowledge and did
not allege that she did anything to invite or solicit his behaviour. 6 Indeed, the
defendant admitted to a police officer that he had obtained the key to the room
from his girlfriend (the plaintiffs roommate) and checked the plaintiffs lecture
16 In a case such as this one (where the behaviour was so outrageous that no reasonable person would
think that it would be welcome), the court can easily infer that the conduct was unwelcome. See, for
example, Insitu leaning Co L v Heads [1995] IRLR 4 ('no one, other than a person used to indulging
in loutish behaviour, could think that the remark made in this case was other than obviously
unwanted.'). However, if the nature of the conduct was such that some people might welcome it, the
court would normally consider whether the plaintiff did anything to 'solicit or invite' the conduct.
See Aldridge v Booth (1988) EOC 92-222, p 77-086.
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timetable so that he could install the camcorder while she was in class. 7 Thus,
although it is not necessary under the law to show that the defendant knew that
his conduct was unwelcome, the care he took to conceal his conduct makes it
clear that he did.
(2) conduct of a sexual nature
The plaintiff testified that when she confronted the defendant he told
her that he had filmed her because he was secretly in love with her and
sexually attracted to her.'" Although he later denied saying this (in his
written defence), he did not testify or introduce any evidence to contradict
the plaintiffs testimony and the court thus found his denial to be
unproven.1 9 However, the court also noted that the defendant may well have
falsely declared love for the plaintiff (in an effort to 'get off the hook') and that
he may have simply filmed the plaintiff for entertainment. 20 Thus it is clear that
the court did not consider the alleged sexual attraction as necessary to the
finding that the defendant engaged in conduct of a sexual nature. This
approach was entirely correct, as neither the SDO nor the relevant case law
from other jurisdictions requires a plaintiff to show that the harasser acted out
of sexual desire.2' What matters is the nature of the conduct itself.2
In this case, the relevant conduct can be defined as follows: secretly filming
a woman while she was in a state of undress. Society has long recognised the
sexual connotations of viewing a woman's body without her consent. For
example, in criminal law, the removal of a woman's clothing without consent
(or some other legal justification) constitutes an indecent assault and therefore
is classified as a sexual offence. This is true, regardless of whether the defendant
acted out of sexual desire, a desire to humiliate her, or simply a desire to steal
her clothing.23 What is significant is that 'right thinking people' would
consider the act to be 'an affront to the sexual modesty of a woman'.24
17 Note 2 above, p 736.1 Ibid, p 735-36.
' Ibid, p 738.20 The defendant told the police that he filmed the plaintiff for fun and told the Privacy Commissioner
that he did it so he and his friend could watch the video together. Ibid, p 744.21 See, for example, Strathclyde Regional Council v Porcelli (note 5 above), in which the defendants
embarked upon a campaign of sexual harassment to compel the plaintiff to quit or a pply for a transfer.
The Queensland Anti-Discrimination Act is a rare example of a statute which unlike the SDO)
refers to the defendant's intentions in the definition of prohibited sexual harassment. However, even
that statute does not require that a defendant acted out of sexual desire, but rather that he acted 'with
the intention of offending, humiliating, or intimidating the other person'. The Queensland Act is
also much broader in application than the SDO in that it is not restricted to particular areas (such
as work and education), but rather applies generally and states simply that a person must not sexuallyharass another person.
23 SeeR v Court [1988]2 All ER 221, in which the House of Lords stated that certain acts (such as
removing a woman's clothes without her consent) are unambiguously indecent, regardless of whether
the defendant acted out of sexual desire.24 Ibid, p 223 (per Lord Griffiths).
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The law of sexual harassment also recognises that certain acts have inherent
sexual connotations, irrespective of the harasser's motive. Sending or displaying
graphic pornography to a woman,25 asking her explicit questions about her
sexual life,26 or making insulting sexual comments about her body27 all fall
within the category of 'conduct of a sexual nature'. Provided that the other
elements of the definition are also satisfied, such acts constitute sexual
harassment regardless of whether a defendant acts out of sexual desire. This is
an important principle, as harassers often do not act out of sexual desire but
rather out of a desire simply to hurt or humiliate the victim. For example, in
Insitu Cleaning Co Ltd v Heads, the defendant made insulting comments to the
plaintiff (such as 'Hiya, big tits') at work. The defendant was much younger
than the plaintiff and there was no indication that he was sexually attracted to
her. The defendant thus attempted to argue that his remarks were not 'sex
related', but rather were the equivalent of commenting upon a man's balding
head. The Employment Appeal Tribunal rejected this argument as absurd,
noting that 'a remark by a man about a woman's breasts cannot sensibly be
equated with a remark by a woman about a bald head or a beard. One is sexual,
the other is not.'28
Similarly, in Yuen Sha Sha, the secret filming of the plaintiff while she
undressed cannot sensibly be equated with other non-sexual invasions of
privacy (such as tapping one's telephone line). While both activities are to be
deplored, the former is sexual in nature, is a clear affront to the plaintiffs sexual
modesty, and is properly addressed as a form of sexual harassment.
(3) in relation to the plaintiff
The requirement that the conduct was in relation to the plaintiff is
sometimes problematic in cases of hostile environment harassment, as the
conduct may be part of the general environment and not specific to one person.
It is for this reason that women's organisations persuaded the Government to
add an alternative definition of hostile environment harassment, s 20)(b),
which does not expressly require that the conduct be in relation to the plaintiff.
However that alternative definition applies only to employment cases. A
woman can still allege hostile environment harassment in the other protected
spheres (such as education), but she would have to prove that the conduct was
in relation to her.
25 See, for example, Robinson v Jacksonville Shipyards, Ind, 760 F Supp 1486 (MD Fla 1990); Home &
Anor v Press Clough Joint Venture & Anor (1994) EOC 92-556 (Western Australian Tribunal).
26 See, for example, Hall &Ors v A& A Sheiban Pty Ltd &O'rs (1989) EOC 92-250, in which questions
in pre-employment interviews (as to whether applicants were having sex with their boyfriends, using
contraceptives, or had ever had an abortion) were held to constitute unlawful sexual harassment.
27 Insitu Cleaning Co Ltd v Heads (note 16 above).
18 lbid, p 5.
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However, this requirement was easily satisfied in Yuen Sha Sha as the filming
was clearly directed at the plaintiff. It should also be noted that after this case
was decided, the requirement that conduct be in relation to the plaintiff was
considered in an action for judicial review (of a decision that a police officer had
violated a Police Headquarters Order which included the SDO definition of
sexual harassment). While the application for judicial review was successful,
the applicant's argument for a narrow interpretation of this requirement (so as
to exclude sexual comments made to a woman which were not actually about
her) was rejected. 9 This indicates that the Hong Kong courts are unlikely to
adopt an unduly narrow interpretation of the phrase.
(4) the reasonable person test
The final requirement is that a reasonable person would have anticipated
that the plaintiff would have been offended, intimidated, or humiliated. This
is often controversial and there is an ongoing debate in the literature on the
question of how the hypothetical reasonable person should be defined.3" Is it
the average male supervisor or the average female secretary? They may have
significantly different views as to whether a course of conduct is likely to offend
or intimidate. However, in this case, it is difficult to see how any reasonable
person (male or female) could fail to anticipate that the average woman would
be offended, humiliated (and very likely frightened) to discover that a man had
been secretly filming her in her bedroom while she changed her clothes.
The one argument that the defendant might have made regarding this
element is that a reasonable person would not have anticipated that the
plaintiff would be offended or humiliated by the filming because the expectation
was that she would never find out about it. On its face, this argument may seem
reasonable, as one normally cannot feel harassed without some awareness of the
relevant conduct. However, a similar argument was rejected in Liberti v Walt
Disney World,31 one of the few reported cases of sexual harassment based upon
secret videotaping. In that case, a male employee had drilled holes in the walls
of the female dancers' dressing area and videotaped them in various states of
undress. The defendant argued (in a motion for summary judgement) that the
plaintiffs could not have perceived a hostile environment, as they were
unaware of the videotaping until after it stopped. The court rejected this
argument and held that the plaintiffs' after-the-fact knowledge could serve as
29 See Ratcliffe v Secretary for the Civil Service, Civil Appeal No 57 of 1999 (on appeal from AL 43 of
30 1998), pp 12-13.
For example, in Ellison v Brady, 934 F.2d. 872, 878-81 (9th Cir. 1991), the trial court held that love
letters and persistent requests for dates were trivial and unlikely to intimidate. However, the appellate
court disagreed and expressly adopted a reasonable woman standard for assessing whether conduct
constituted unlawful harassment.31 912 F Supp 1494, 1504 (MD Fla 1995) (denying defendant's motion for summary judgement). The
case settled before trial.
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the basis for their perception that a hostile work environment existed. The
same principle could be applied to the reasonable person test in Yuen Sha Sha,
as the statute does not require that a reasonable person would anticipate that
the plaintiff would feel offended, humiliated, or intimidated while the acts were
actually ongoing.
II. Remedies for sexual harassment
Although Judge Wong did not provide much analysis of the liability issues, she
discussed the issue of remedies in more detail. Counsel for the defendant had
offered an apology in court on behalf of the defendant. However, the plaintiff
had requested a written apology (under s 76(3A)(b) of the SDO) and the judge
ordered the defendant to provide it.32
The question of damages was more difficult. In many cases of sexual
harassment, the plaintiff alleges some economic loss. For example, she may
have been fired from her job for resisting the harassment or may have quit in
order to escape it. Victims may also suffer long-term damage to their physical
and emotional health (and thus to their earning potential) as a result of the
harassment. In this case, however, the plaintiff did not allege any economic
loss. She was a full-time student at the time of the incident and although it
caused her to miss classes for a period of time, she nonetheless graduated with
an upper second class honours degree a few months later.33 At the time of the
trial, she was employed as a teacher34 and apparently did not allege that the
incident had adversely affected her career.
Thus, the bulk of the damages awarded were for injury to feelings (which are
expressly provided for by s 76(6) of the SDO), for which the court awarded the
plaintiff $50,000. The incident caused the plaintiff considerable distress and
humiliation. As the court summarised,
... the incident had left her feeling violated, exploited, betrayed, humiliated
and hurt. This was particularly so when she regarded the Defendant as one
of her good friends. For sometime after the discovery, she was afraid to stay
in her hostel room, and for the month following she was unable to go to sleep
alone, and she did not attend class for 2-3 weeks. She felt she was watched
whenever she changed her clothes.35
As I noted earlier, there are very few reported cases of sexual harassment
based entirely upon an invasion of privacy. In searching for comparable cases,
the court referred to one case of racial discrimination and also to defamation
32 Note 2 above, p 746.
33 Ibid, p 741.
34 Ibid, p 745.
35 Ibid, p 737.
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cases. The rationale for considering defamation cases was apparently the theory
that the plaintiffs reputation had been damaged. In my view this focus was
inappropriate, as it only reinforces the outdated presumption that a woman is
somehow less reputable after a man violates her dignity. It also missed the real
crux of the plaintiffs claim for injured feelings, which was her sense of
violation, betrayal, and fear. The incident left her unable to stay alone in her
room, to fall asleep on her own, or to escape the feeling that she was being
watched when she changed her clothes. These feelings are similar to those
experienced by victims of a sexual assault. An award that is based upon ordinary
defamation cases simply cannot compensate for such feelings of violation and
emotional distress.
The other problem with relying so heavily upon defamation cases is that this
inevitably leads a court to devalue the feelings of a woman who is not well
known in the community. This is precisely what the court did in this case,
noting that the plaintiff 'was a student and not, at the time, a person enjoying
a reputation in the community'. 6 While this might be appropriate in measuring
the element of hurt feelings (if any) that was based upon injury to reputation,
it is entirely irrelevant to the other feelings (fear, betrayal and violation) to
which the plaintiff testified. In my view, the court's approach caused it to
seriously undervalue the damages suffered by the plaintiff.
The court did, however, also award exemplary and aggravated damages
(totalling $30,000) and this part of the judgement shows greater sensitivity to
the feelings of the plaintiff and the violation of her dignity.37 The court found
that the defendant's acts were aggravated by his perverted lewdness
(demonstrated by the care he took in directing the lens to the plaintiffs dressing
area), the fact that he had filmed her over an extended period of time, and the
fact that he showed the tape to his friend.3" The defendant had also tormented
the plaintiff after the complaint was filed. In particular, he had initiated (with
his girlfriend) a civil action in nuisance39 against her and had persuaded a
schoolmate to telephone her on the day before the hearing to pressure her to
abandon the complaint.4" The plaintiff testified that these calls made her feel
further upset and threatened, and that she became sleepless and vomited the
next day.4' As the court concluded, the defendant 'deliberately added insult to
injury. He was defiant, unrepentant and vindictive. His behaviour is tantamount
to flouting the legislation. Such behaviour is reprehensible and should not be
condoned.' 42
36 Ibid, p 741.
37 Ibid, pp 742-46.
38 Ibid, p 743-44.
39 Ibid, p 744. The action in nuisance (which alleged that the plaintiff breached rules regarding guests
in rooms) was unsuccessful. See South China Morning Post, 6 March 1999, p 3.40 Note 2 above, p 744.
4' Ibid, p 738.
42 Ibid, p 746.
Vol129 Part 2 Implemeniting equality: anti-discrimination laws 187
The court's strong language is appropriate. In most sexual harassment cases
(particularly where the plaintiff claims no economic loss), the complaint can
be settled with a genuine apology and a fairly small amount of monetary
compensation. Most victims of sexual harassment do not want to go to court.
Like victims of sexual assault, they do not relish the idea of having to relive the
violation of their dignity, answer endless questions, and endure hostile cross-
examination (all of which is likely to be reported in the press). Nor do they want
to wait two years (as this plaintiff did) for compensation and resolution. This
is one of the reasons that the legislature established the EOC and gave it the
power to conciliate cases. But conciliation will only work if both parties
approach it in good faith. The court's decision to increase damages as a result
of this defendant's poor behaviour after the complaint was filed will hopefully
encourage future defendants to behave more reasonably.
III. Disability discrimination: Ma Bik Yung v Ko Chuen
Like the SDO, the DDO also prohibits discrimination in a wide range of
protected spheres, including employment, education, and the provision of
goods and services. In particular, s 26(l) prohibits providers of goods, services
and facilities from discriminating against disabled persons by failing to serve
them, by giving them less favourable terms and conditions, or in the manner
in which they serve them. Transportation is, of course, one of the most
important services consumed by people with physical disabilities, particularly
since Hong Kong is far from being a 'barrier free' society.
The definition of discrimination under the DDO can be found in s 6. It
employs the traditional two-part structure, prohibiting both direct and indirect
discrimination. Direct discrimination (which is what was alleged in this case)
is a relatively straightforward concept. It occurs when a person treats another
person, on the ground of his disability, less favourably than he treats or would
treat a person without a disability. For example, if a restaurant refuses to serve
anyone who uses a wheelchair, that is a clear example of direct discrimination.
Indirect discrimination (which was not alleged in this case) is more
complicated. It occurs when a person applies a requirement or condition
equally (to people with and without a disability) but the requirement is such
that the proportion of persons with a disability who can comply with it is
considerably smaller than the proportion of persons without a disability who
can comply with it and the defendant cannot justify the requirement under the
circumstances. For example, if the restaurant required all patrons to climb a
flight of stairs (because it wanted to keep the elevator available to move food
supplies up to the restaurant), that would be an example of indirect
discrimination. Although it might be applied equally to all customers, those
who use wheelchairs would be unable to comply with it and would be adversely
188 Analysis (1999) HKLJ
affected by it. Unless the restaurant could justify the requirement under the
circumstances, it would be considered unlawful discrimination.
The DDO also prohibits disability harassment, which occurs where a person:
engages in unwelcome conduct (which may include an oral or written
statement) on account of [the] second-mentioned person's disability, or on
account of the disability of an associate of that second-mentioned person,
in circumstances in which a reasonable person, having regard to all the
circumstances, would have anticipated that the second-mentioned person
would be offended, humiliated or intimidated by that conduct.43
In certain respects this definition is similar to the definition of sexual
harassment." For example, both definitions employ a partly objective test: the
court must decide whether a 'reasonable person' would have anticipated that
the conduct would be offensive, humiliating, or intimidating. However, the
definition of disability harassment differs from that of sexual harassment in that
it includes statements and conduct made 'on account of the disability of an
associate of the second-mentioned person'.4" This was considered necessary in
order to protect relatives, friends, co-workers, and caregivers of people with
disabilities, who also may be subjected to harassment as a result of their
relationship.
In Ma Bik Yung the plaintiff alleged both direct discrimination and disability
harassment against the defendant, a taxi driver. The plaintiff, a paraplegic, was
waiting for a taxi in her wheelchair. She was taking her sister (who suffered from
schizophrenia, stiff limbs, and trembling hands) to a medical appointment. The
plaintiff testified that she repeatedly waved to the defendant but received no
response. She moved toward his taxi and had to knock several times on the
passenger door before he eventually opened it. 6 When she asked for assistance
with her wheelchair, she claimed that he responded rudely, saying 'who do you
think you are, my responsibility is to drive and I have no responsibility [for] your
wheelchair.'47 Eventually, a passer-by helped the plaintiff with the wheelchair.
The plaintiff further alleged that the defendant abused her verbally on the
way to the clinic and refused to retrieve the wheelchair from the boot, forcing
her to wait in the taxi until she could once again ask a passer-by for assistance.
She testified that by the time she left the taxi, she was in tears and her sister was
agitated and trembling more than usual.4" She further testified that she felt
"3 [D O , s 2(6). t d ab v
4 Compare with s 2(5) of the SDO, quoted above.
45 See s 2 for the definition of 'associate", which is quite comprehensive.
46 "Note 3 above, p 717-1 8.
17 Ibid, p 718.
41 Ibid.
Vol129 Part 2 Implementing equality: anti-discrimination laws 189
humiliated and upset for a long time afterward and that the incident affected
her ability to care for her sister (who committed suicide before the trial).49
The defendant taxi driver testified to a significantly different version of the
facts. He claimed that he did not notice the plaintiff until she knocked on the
back of his taxi, at which point he got out and held open the door for her. He
testified that he explained to the plaintiff that he was unable to lift the
wheelchair by himself due to his own disability (he had undergone hip surgery
in 1974) and that he instead asked passers-by to help him. He also denied
abusing the plaintiff verbally.50
Thus, the outcome of the case depended to a large extent on the judge's
assessment of the witnesses' credibility. The judge found that the plaintiff was
an honest witness who provided many details of the incident when questioned
by the defendant's counsel.51 In contrast, the court found that the defendant
became evasive, hesitant, and uncertain when cross-examined and gave vague
and contrived answers. The court concluded that the defendant was 'a
completely unreliable witness and his evidence unconvincing.'52 The court
thus found as facts that the defendant had failed to acknowledge the plaintiff
when she tried to request his services, refused to help her with her wheelchair,
made rude, hurtful, and derogatory remarks about her physical disability on the
way to the clinic, and upon arrival once again refused to either help with the
wheelchair or to summon help from passers-by.53
Having accepted entirely the plaintiffs version of the facts, the court then
easily concluded that the defendant had committed unlawful disability
harassment. The driver's conduct was clearly unwelcome conduct on the
account of the plaintiffs disability, and a reasonable person would anticipate
that she would have been offended, humiliated, or intimidated by it.
The analysis of direct discrimination was somewhat more complicated.
According to the court's decision, the defendant argued that the correct
comparator was another disabled person with a piece of heavy luggage,
apparently on the rather strained theory that what was actually alleged here was
simply discrimination on the ground of the plaintiffs wheelchair (prohibited
by s 9 of the DDO). The court correctly rejected this argument and held that
the correct question was whether the plaintiff had been treated less favourably
than a person without a disability would have been treated. 14
The defendant also argued that his own disability (a hip problem) brought
him within the unjustifiable hardship exemption provided in s 26(2). The
41 Ibid, pp 718-19.
50 lbid, p 719.51 lbid, p 720.
52 lbid, p 72t.
'3 [bid, pp 721-22.
11 [bid, pp 724-25. However the defendant has argued in his application for leave to appeal that the court
misunderstood the argument on this point.
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unjustifiable hardship defence is designed to protect defendants from having to
make very expensive or burdensome accommodations for disabled persons.
However, it is not meant to exempt providers of services from the obligation
to make reasonable accommodations for their disabled customers. This is clear
from the definition, which states that in determining what constitutes an
unjustifiable hardship, all relevant circumstances of the particular case are to
be taken into account including:
(a) the reasonableness of any accommodation to be made available to a
person with a disability;
(b) the nature of the benefit or detriment likely to accrue or be suffered by
any persons concerned;
(c) the effect of the disability of a person concerned;
(d) the financial circumstances of and the estimated amount of expenditure
(including recurrent expenditure) required to be made by the person
claiming unjustifiable hardship.
Thus the concept of unjustifiable hardship requires the court to balance the
needs of the disabled person against those of the defendant. The fact that the
defendant may have to exert some special effort or spend some money to
accommodate the needs of the disabled is not necessarily a defence. The
question is whether the extra effort required of the defendant was truly
unreasonable under the circumstances.
In this case, although it was not disputed that the defendant himself suffered
from a disability, the court refused to hold that this brought him within the
exemption in s 26(2). The defence might have been successful had the plaintiff
alleged that the defendant should have personally lifted the wheelchair.
However, the plaintiffs argument was that he had a duty to offer services to her
in a civil manner, and to summon help if he could not lift the wheelchair on
his own. Instead of doing so, he tried to avoid serving her and verbally abused
her. As the court correctly stated '[h]is own disability certainly does not give
him a license to be uncivil, to insult and to treat a fellow human being with
contempt, particularly someone with a disability.' 55
The court then considered the issue of damages. Once again, the plaintiff
had not alleged any specific economic losses. The court took into account the
fact that the discrimination and harassment took place within a relatively short
period of time and awarded significantly less than in the case of Yuen Sha Sa.
Unfortunately, since the damages awarded in Yuen Sha Sha were (in my
opinion) insufficient, this approach resulted in a very small award in this case.
The court awarded only $15,000 for injury to feelings, plus $5,000 in punitive
" Ibid, p 727.
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damages (which is expressly provided for ins 72(4)(0 of the DDO).56 The court
also ordered the defendant to deliver a written apology for his actions."
In calculating damages, the court noted that the 'award should not be
minimal as it would trivialise or diminish respect for the public policy and the
spirit on which the Ordinance was based.'58 Unfortunately, this award may do
precisely that. A total of $20,000 in damages is quite small and may discourage
other victims of disability discrimination and harassment (particularly those
who cannot show any tangible economic loss) from litigating. A victim could
rationally decide that a potential award of $20,000 simply does not justify:
(1) the legal expenses (which, as explained in the next section are normally not
recoverable); and (2) the physical and emotional stress of testifying (which may
be particularly trying for a person with a disability). Of course, if respondents
know that victims are unlikely to litigate, this will undermine respect for the
law, as well as the ability of the EOC to obtain reasonable settlement offers in
the conciliation process.
IV. Legal costs in actions for discrimination and harassment
The normal rule in civil actions in Hong Kong is that the court will award costs
to the prevailing party (i.e. 'costs follow the event'). While this has the
beneficial effect of deterring frivolous litigation, it can also deter people with
legitimate claims from commencing lawsuits. A potential plaintiff can never be
certain of winning a lawsuit and would understandably be afraid to sue if there
was a chance that she could be held liable for the defendant's legal costs.
In order to remove this fear, the District Court Ordinance provides that
each party to any proceedings brought under Hong Kong's anti-discrimination
ordinances 'shall bear its own costs unless the Court orders otherwise on the
ground that (a) the proceedings were brought maliciously or frivolously; or
(b) there are special circumstances which warrant an award of costs.'59 This is
a sensible approach, one which seeks to protect defendants from frivolous
litigation but also enables plaintiffs with reasonable claims to sue without fear
of being bankrupted. However, since successful plaintiffs normally will not
recover their legal costs, it is very important that judges give reasonable damage
awards, not only for economic losses but also for injury to feelings.
Interestingly, in both cases discussed here, the court did find special
circumstances and awarded costs (although, as noted below, the awards could
not be enforced). The court's decision to award costs in Yuen Sha Sha is not
surprising, as the court found that the defendant had behaved outrageously
56 Ibid, pp 730.
5 Ibid.
58 Ibid, p 729.
9 District Court Ordinance, ss 73B and 73C.
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(perhaps even maliciously) after the complaint was filed. Although the
defendant did not dispute the facts, he refused to apologise or conciliate the
matter, forcing the plaintiff to wait two years for a remedy, to relive the entire
event in court, and to suffer the embarrassment of having the matter reported,
yet again, in the press. Moreover, he embarked upon a deliberate strategy to
further intimidate her, initiating a nuisance action against her (which was
thrown out of court), persuading his friend to pressure her to drop the
complaint, and 'threatening to adduce evidence from witnesses' to show that
she had lied." Such behaviour constitutes more than enough special
circumstances to justify an award of costs. Indeed, if costs were not awarded in
this case, it is hard to imagine circumstances in which they would be awarded.
However, the special circumstances in the disability case are much less clear.
There was a genuine dispute over the facts and the decision does not report any
post-complaint intimidation by the taxi driver. The court simply stated that the
award of costs was based upon the defendant's conduct and failure to apologise.
The judge may also have taken into account the fact that she found the
defendant to be a 'completely unreliable witness' and accepted the plaintiffs
testimony in every disputed question of fact. The parties' two versions of the
facts were so different that the discrepancies could not have been the result of
a mistake on the part of the defendant. Thus, the court essentially found that
the taxi driver had lied on the stand. This factor, combined with his failure to
apologise and settle the matter in conciliation, arguably does justify an award
of costs. However, the judge should have been more explicit in her reasons for
departing from the presumption provided in the legislation.
In any event, the judge's decision to award costs in these two cases could not
be enforced. This is because the defendants in both cases received legal aid.
Section 16C(1) of the Legal Aid Ordinance provides that where a court makes
an award of costs against an aided person, neither that person nor the Director
of Legal Aid shall be liable for such costs (unless the non-aided person was a
defendant or respondent in the proceedings). Given that a court can only make
an award of costs (in cases brought under the anti-discrimination ordinances)
in the presence of special circumstances, it is arguable that this provision in the
Legal Aid Ordinance should be reconsidered.6
It should also be noted that in both cases discussed here the plaintiffs had
similarly requested legal aid but were turned down by the Legal Aid Department.
6 Ibid. In fact, the defendant did not call any witnesses.
61 The EC has also suggested that the anti-discrimination ordinances be amended so as to make it clear
that if an award of costs is made in favour of a plaintiff who received assistance from the EOC, then
the EOC could recover its costs for legal work done by its own lawyers, in the same manner as the Legal
Aid Department. See EOC, Equal Opportunities Legislative Review: Proposals for Amendment of
the Sex Discrimination Ordinance and the Disability Discrimination Ordinance (February 1999),
para 11. At present the legislation clearly states that the EOC can recover its expenses, but it is unclear
as to whether it can recover its costs. See s 85(4) of the SDO and s 81(4) of the DDO.
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Fortunately, the EOC granted them legal assistance, allowing their complaints
to be litigated. However, the EOC has limited funds for this purpose and cannot
grant legal assistance to every meritorious case. I would suggest that a review
is needed regarding the criteria that are applied by the Legal Aid Department
to requests for legal aid. In these two cases, the damages awarded were not large
(and in my opinion, were not sufficient). However, this is a very new area of law
in Hong Kong, one that seeks to enhance social justice in our community. It
is important that meritorious cases are tried in the courts, even if they are not
likely to result in large damage awards. If it becomes apparent that complainants
will not receive legal aid, then the law will be weakened as an agent of social
change. The ability of the EOC to successfully conciliate complaints will
similarly be undermined, as respondents will know that litigation is unlikely.
Like all laws, Hong Kong's anti-discrimination ordinances will only have a
positive impact if they can be effectively enforced. Supporting valid complaints
with legal assistance is one essential element of that enforcement process.
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Corporate Governance in the Information Age:
The Impact of Information Technology and
Emerging Legal Issues
Introduction
Corporate governance has, as its primary objective, the enhancement of
corporate profits and shareholder gain.' It has been defined as the 'rules and
practices put in place within a company to manage information and economic
incentive problems inherent in the separation of ownership from control in
large enterprises' and as dealing with 'how, and to what extent, the interests of
various agents involved in the company are reconciled and what checks and
incentives are put in place to ensure that managers maximise the value of the
investment made by shareholders.'2
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